Board monitoring and capital structure dynamics: evidence from bank-based economies by Ezeani, E et al.
Ezeani, E and Salem, R and Kwabi, F and Boutaine, K and Bilal and Komal,
B (2021) Board monitoring and capital structure dynamics: evidence from






Usage rights: Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0
Please cite the published version
https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk
Vol.:(0123456789)




Board monitoring and capital structure dynamics: evidence 
from bank‑based economies
Ernest Ezeani1  · Rami Salem2 · Frank Kwabi3 · Khalid Boutaine2 · Bilal4  · 
Bushra Komal5
Accepted: 24 June 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
We examine the impact of board characteristics on the speed of adjustment and the capital 
structure dynamics of firms in bank-based economies. Using 3927 firm-year observations 
over a 10-year (2009–2019), we find that board characteristic influences firms’ speed of 
adjustment in a bank-based (stakeholder-oriented) system. We also find some evidence that 
board characteristics have varying impacts on the capital structure of Japanese, French and 
German firms. We conclude that firms’ capital structure reflects the corporate governance 
environment they operate. Our results are robust to accounting for endogeneity and alterna-
tive leverage measure.
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1 Introduction
Prior studies have shown the importance of agency relationships on firms’ financing deci-
sions. These studies postulate that corporate governance characteristics are important 
determinants of firms’ capital structure (Becker-Blease and Irani 2008; Kieschnick and 
Moussawi 2018; Kim et al. 2007; Liao et al. 2015; Morellec et al. 2012). One key channel 
through which corporate governance influences firms’ capital structure in a shareholder-
oriented CG environment is by adjusting leverage to the level desired by the firm’s share-
holders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In line with the agency theory of free cash flow, the 
board is likely to support more debt to reduce cash diversion and free cash flow available 
to firms’ managers. Its role is to ensure that shareholders decide what is considered an 
optimal debt level. Thus, leverage is an essential instrument of control in (market-based) 
shareholder-oriented CG environment such as in the UK and US.
The question that is likely to arise is whether the corporate board influences firms’ 
financing decisions in the same way in bank-based economies. This issue is vital given the 
distinction between bank-based and market-based economies in finance literature (Bats and 
Houben 2020; Beck and Levine 2002; Chakraborty and Ray 2006; Levine 2002). Studies 
have also shown that formal institutions and national contexts have implications for firms’ 
financing decisions (Johnson et al. 2010), which implies that capital structure may differ 
even within bank-based system.
This study, therefore, examines the impact of board characteristics on the capital struc-
ture dynamics of Japanese, German and French firms, which are classified as bank-based 
economies with a different (stakeholder-oriented) corporate governance (CG) approach. 
Our research is interesting since, on the one hand, these countries have similar financial 
orientations and corporate governance systems (La Porta et al. 2000). On the other hand, 
they have remarkable differences in their corporate governance environment despite the 
ongoing convergence efforts (O’Sullivan 2003). These three countries provide the desired 
setting to examine whether board monitoring has an impact on firms’ capital structure.
Our motivation for undertaking this study is as follows: First, empirical findings in coun-
tries classified as bank-based are not keeping up with the theoretical development in capi-
tal structure research. Notably, previous capital structure studies have ignored the impact 
of corporate governance on firms’ leverage in market-based economies (Kieschnick and 
Moussawi 2018; Morellec et al. 2012). These studies assume that the lessons learned from 
the market-based (shareholder-oriented) environment are generalizable to the stakeholder-
oriented setting. In the Anglo-Saxon literature, the widely held view is that firms’ capital 
structure decisions should reflect shareholders’ interest (Hackbarth 2008; Harris and Raviv 
1991; Himmelberg and Tsyplakov 2020; Nguyen et al. 2020). Consequently, the prevailing 
CG model is designed to advance the interest of firms’ shareholder (Kim et al. 2007; Liao 
et al. 2015; Morellec et al. 2012; Nguyen et al. 2020) by limiting managerial preferences 
through monitoring duties of outside directors (Endo 2020). However, unlike Anglo-Saxon 
(market-based) economies, Japan, Germany, and France operate a stakeholder CG system 
that deviates from the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model (Hopt and Leyens 2004; 
Kim et al. 2007; Levine 2002; Schmidt and Tyrell 1997).
Secondly, despite the similarities between Japan, Germany, and France as bank-based 
economies, studies suggest that corporate governance varies across these countries 
(Dore 2005; Jackson and Moerke 2005; Kim et al. 2007). For instance, the legal dimen-
sion of the German co-determination principle is not comparable with French firms’ 
involvement of employees using work councils. It, therefore, contradicts the informal 
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employee participation in Japan. Furthermore, Germany’s mandatory two-tier board 
arrangement (Management and supervisory board) sharply contrasts Japan’s unitary 
model or a voluntary board arrangement in France. Studies also show that Japan’s cor-
porate governance model is less rigid than the model employed in Germany and France 
(Endo 2020; Jackson and Moerke 2005). Jackson and Moerke (2005) suggest that the 
Japanese CG is a community model while Germany has a constitutional model.
Finally, most studies adopted an agency approach in (Anglo-Saxon) market-based 
economies (Barnea et al. 1981; Hackbarth 2008; Harris and Raviv 1991; Harvey et al. 
2004; Leland and Toft 1996; Mauer and Sarkar 2005). This one-sided approach has led 
to the popularity of the shareholder-oriented CG model as a baseline for comparative 
evaluation of firms’ capital structure decisions (Kieschnick and Moussawi 2018; Morel-
lec et al. 2012). The implication is that the impact of board monitoring on firms’ capital 
structure in the non-English-speaking world is still unclear (Dore 2005).
Therefore, using panel data of 3927 firm-year observation from 2009 to 2019, we 
examine the impact of board characteristics on Japanese, German, and French firms’ 
capital structure dynamics. We show that the impact of board characteristics on 
firms’ capital structure varies across bank-based economies. Board gender diversity is 
inversely related to market leverage in France and Germany. However, we found no rela-
tionship for Japanese firms. Similarly, outside directors and board meetings are neg-
atively associated with market leverage in Germany but show a positive relationship 
in Japan. Board size is inversely related to our leverage proxies in all countries. We 
employed book leverage as an alternative proxy of firms’ capital structure and found 
similar results. We also re-estimated our study equation by comparing the impact of 
board characteristics on the market leverage across EU countries (Germany and France) 
and Japan. We found that board characteristics are inversely related to market leverage 
in EU countries (Germany and France). However, in line with our main results, outside 
director and board meetings are positively associated with leverage among Japanese 
firms. We also confirm that board gender diversity is not a capital structure determinant 
in Japan. Our findings are neither influence by zero-debt firms nor mechanical mean 
reversion (e.g., Chang and Dasgupta 2009). Using Wilcoxon and T-test, we confirm a 
significant difference between Japanese, German, and French firms.
Our key contributions are as follows. Previous evidence on the impact of corporate 
governance on capital structure focuses on firms in market-based economies, especially 
the US (Kieschnick and Moussawi 2018; Liao et  al. 2015; Morellec et  al. 2012). We 
examine the impact of board monitoring on firms’ capital structure in typical bank-based 
economies and found that board monitoring has varying effects on the capital struc-
ture of Japanese, German and French firms. Secondly, we reported higher SOA among 
Japanese, German and French firms when CG variables are included in the regression 
and lower SOA after excluding board variables. Our result shows that the variation in 
corporate governance and institutional environment affects firms’ adjustment behaviour 
regardless of the similarity of the financial system. Thirdly, we find higher SOA among 
German firms when compared to Japanese and French firms, implying that the strict 
separation between management and supervisory board is likely to influence lenders’ 
assessment of the firm.
We structure our paper as follows: In Sect.  2, we review related literature on the 
impact of the board on capital structure decision. Section 3 discusses the study’s meth-
odology. In Sect. 4, we present our main results and additional tests. In Sect. 5, we con-
clude and discuss the policy implication of our study.
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2  Related literature
2.1  Institutional background
Bank-based economies such as Japan, France, and Germany have a unique corporate 
governance environment that is distinguishable from the model used in capital mar-
ket economies (Dore 2005; Jackson and Moerke 2005; Köke 2004). The adoption of a 
stakeholder approach to corporate governance in these economies ensures that the inter-
est of all stakeholders is protected (Feils et  al. 2018). Unlike in the shareholder-ori-
ented CG model, where an arms-length relationship is assumed between firms and their 
lenders, banks play an active role in firms’ financing and managing agency conflict. In 
addition to lenders’ involvement, firms in a stakeholder-oriented governance environ-
ment are required to involve their employees in the management process, thereby form-
ing a stable coalition with various stakeholders (Fauver and Fuerst 2006; Feils et  al. 
2018; Jackson and Moerke 2005). Although these countries have a similar corporate 
governance model, they have some significant variations in their CG approach. How-
ever, unlike Japanese firms where a unitary board system operates, firms in Germany 
are obliged to adopt a two-tier board system. In contrast, French firms are allowed to 
choose either a unitary model or a two-tier system.
Japanese firms have embedded stakeholder-friendly behaviour in their corporate gov-
ernance system (Aoki 2010; Endo 2020; Witt and Redding 2012). The main charac-
teristics of a Japanese stakeholder-driven corporate governance are the unitary board 
system (Jackson and Moerke 2005), the dominance of insiders on the corporate board, 
and a limited number of outsiders on the corporate board (Endo 2020). Unlike in the 
German system, where the board is expected to compensate for lack of market control 
(Köke 2004; Tran 2014), the Japanese corporate governance system does not emphasize 
monitoring. Outside directors of Japanese firms are expected to bring their expertise and 
connections to the firms they serve. The idea is to serve their community through the 
service they render to their firms (Witt and Redding 2012).
Germany is a prototype of a bank-based system (Köke 2004) with a two-tier board 
system comprising of a management board and supervisory board (Cromme 2005; 
Edwards and Nibler 2000; Fauver and Fuerst 2006; Hopt and Leyens 2004; Jackson and 
Moerke 2005; Kim et al. 2007; Tran 2014). The management board oversees the opera-
tional activities of the firms while the supervisory board monitors the activities of the 
management with an additional advisory role and co-decision making (Cromme 2005; 
Tran 2014). The supervisory board members include employees’, bank, and sharehold-
ers’ representatives, thereby ensuring non-market control. Employees’ representation is 
legally guaranteed through the co-determination framework (Edwards and Nibler 2000). 
The corporate governance system allows outsiders to represent various stakehold-
ers such as large block holders, banks and employees. (Franks and Mayer 1998; Köke 
2004). Closset and Urban (2019) argue that large creditors’ power within the German 
corporate governance system substitutes non-market control.
However, unlike Germany and Japan, French firms operate primarily in a family-
based financial system (Johnson et  al. 2010). They are free to adopt either a unitary 
board system (one-tier) or a two-tier board system. Traditionally, collectivism is at the 
centre of France’s corporate governance environment. Through work council, firms 
involve their employees in management (Antal and Sobczak 2007) to ensure that their 
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voices are heard. Employee representation is embedded in the 1982 law that obliges 
firms to consult with their employees before embarking on any significant restructuring.
Although these countries are all classified as bank-based systems, they have a unique 
corporate governance environment. Jackson and Moerke (2005) argue that their similarity 
lies in their contrast with the Anglo-Saxon model. For instance, the German co-determi-
nation principle is legally embedded since giving employees a voice is a political deci-
sion deemed to be in the interest of the German public. Similarly, the two-tier board is 
legally enforced as a deliberate intervention (promotion of adequate checks and balances) 
in the management of firms. This legal dimension of the German board system is similar 
to that of France, whereby firms are mandated to involve employees through work coun-
cils. However, it sharply contrasts the Japanese unitary board system where management 
and monitoring are not separated. Unlike in Germany, Japan has no clear legal distinction 
between Internal and external board members. Employees’ participation in Japanese firms 
is achieved through an informal arrangement (Jackson and Moerke 2005). Additionally, 
Japanese, German and French firms have incrementally reformed their corporate govern-
ance since the mid-1990 through different legislative measures. These reforms are likely to 
make the parallels between them more striking.
2.2  Board characteristics and speed of leverage adjustment
The dynamic trade-off theory argues that firms have target leverage adjusted by balancing 
its benefits and costs (Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006; Elsas and Florysiak 2011; Huang 
and Ritter 2009; Leary and Roberts 2005; Wanzenried 2006). Although Hovakimian et al. 
(2001) suggest a uniform adjustment speed, other studies found various determinants of 
speed of adjustment (Cao and Cui 2021; Dang et al. 2014; De Miguel and Pindado 2001; 
Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006; Komera and Lukose 2016). For instance, De Miguel and 
Pindado (2001), Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) and Dang et al. (2014) show that adjust-
ment to target leverage is not complete and is mainly driven by firm-level factors. Öztekin 
and Flannery (2012) and Cook and Tang (2010) documented the impact of institutional 
and macro-economic factors. Other studies show the relevance of cash flows (Faulkender 
et al. 2012), deviation from the target (Zhou et al. 2016), trade credit (Cao and Cui 2021) 
and debt covenant (Devos et al. 2017). Due to contradictory evidence Graham and Leary 
(2011) questions whether the dynamic trade-off model is sufficient to explain a firm’s SOA.
Unlike the dynamic trade-off model, the pecking order theory suggests that if a firm 
prefers internally generated funds, its adjustment behaviour is likely to be determined by 
whether it has surplus funds or deficits. In line with the dynamic pecking order theory, a 
firm with a surplus fund is expected to conserve its borrowing capacity if its cost of equity 
is high, thereby resulting in asymmetry in adjustment behaviour.
Although few studies have shown the impact of corporate governance on the speed of 
adjustment (Kieschnick and Moussawi 2018; Liao et al. 2015; Morellec et al. 2012), these 
studies are conducted using data from market-based (shareholder-oriented) economies, 
especially the US and UK. Due to the uniqueness of their corporate governance environ-
ment and financial orientation, their finding is likely to have little implication for firms in 
bank-based economies with different agency logic. Unlike in bank-based economies, the 
widely held view in the Anglo-Saxon literature (Market-based economies) is that firms’ 
capital structure decision should reflect shareholders’ interest (Hackbarth 2008; Harris and 
Raviv 1991; Himmelberg and Tsyplakov 2020; Nguyen et al. 2020).
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However, bank-based economies have a stakeholder approach to corporate govern-
ance and firms enjoy a closer relationship with their creditors. The implication of this 
more intimate relationship is the likelihood of influencing the perception of lenders 
through monitoring by different stakeholder groups, resulting in a decrease in firms’ 
cost of debt and a speedier adjustment. Studies show that dual board structure in Ger-
many increases boards’ monitoring role (Jackson and Moerke 2005; Johnson et al. 2010; 
Köke 2004) and mitigates agency conflict (Edwards and Nibler 2000; Fauver and Fuerst 
2006). Furthermore, the strict separation between management and supervisory board 
(contradicts the unitary board system in Japan and voluntary arrangement in France) is 
likely to result in a speedier adjustment for German firms when compared to French and 
Japanese firms. Following the above discussions, we test the following hypothesis:
H1 SOA will be higher for German firms compared to French and Japanese firms.
2.3  Board characteristics and capital structure
2.3.1  Board gender diversity
A board is assumed to be gender diverse if at least one female director is a board mem-
ber (Adams and Ferreira 2009). Prior literature suggests that board gender diversity 
impacts the quality of its discussion and influences its monitoring ability (Campbell and 
Mínguez-Vera 2008; Gul et al. 2011; Kao et al. 2020; Komal et al. 2021). Female board 
members bring different perspectives to the board (Frye and Pham 2018; Reguera-Alva-
rado et al. 2017; Robinson and Dechant 1997) since they are not part of the ’old boys’ 
club (Adams and Ferreira 2009). Other studies found that women have less appetite for 
risky decisions (Adusei and Obeng 2019; Faccio et al. 2016; Palvia et al. 2015). This 
risk-aversion makes it unlikely for a female board member to consider any financing 
option that bears significant risk, especially default risk. Given women’s aversion to 
risk, firms leverage is likely to be below the level desired by firms’ managers if signifi-
cant proportion are women.
France is one of the countries with a relatively high representation of women on the 
corporate board. Following the Copé-Zimmermann law in 2011, listed firms are man-
dated to ensure a 40% gender quota in corporate boards. Similarly, German firms have 
significantly increased their gender quota on the board of directors since the country 
amended the Corporate Governance Code of (2010) by introducing a mandatory quota 
of 30% for all listed German firms. On the other hand, Japan has one of the lowest board 
gender quotas among all developed countries. Endo (2020) described the Japanese 
board as ’old-boy networks’ due to the low level of female representation in the Japa-
nese board. For instance, in 2016, the percentage of female directors on the Japanese 
board is only 3.4. Due to the increasing representation of women on the board on the 
supervisory board of German firms, we expect a negative relationship between board 
gender diversity and leverage in Germany and France and no relationship for Japanese 
firms. Following the above discussions, we test the following hypothesis:
H2 Board gender diversity has a negative relationship with leverage in German and French 
firms and no relationship in Japanese firms.
Board monitoring and capital structure dynamics: evidence…
1 3
2.3.2  Outside directors
The role of outside directors varies across various corporate governance environment. 
In a shareholder-oriented CG setting, the independence of outside directors ensures that 
managers’ interest is aligned with that of shareholders (Uribe-Bohorquez et al. 2018). 
The Anglo-Saxon literature defines an independent board as one that is dominated by 
outsiders (Coles et  al. 2008; Ferreira et  al. 2018; Kim et  al. 2007), who are excluded 
from day-to-day operation (De Villiers et al. 2011).
In bank-based economies, outside directors are not required to be independent (Endo 
2020; Kim et  al. 2007) and are selected from various stakeholder group. However, 
their responsibilities vary even within a stakeholder-oriented governance arrangement. 
Unlike France and Japan, the German supervisory board, for instance, comprises firms’ 
creditors and employees. Creditors perform additional monitoring functions (Cromme 
2005; Edwards and Nibler 2000; Franks and Mayer 1998; Hopt and Leyens 2004; Jack-
son and Moerke 2005; Tran 2014), thereby helping to mitigate agency conflict (Edwards 
and Nibler 2000; Fauver and Fuerst 2006; Köke 2004). This direct monitoring is likely 
to reduce the supposed arms-length relationship between firms and their lenders, result-
ing in stricter lending terms. In France, employees are indirectly involved in monitor-
ing through the work council (Antal and Sobczak 2007). In Japan, outside directors are 
appointed to contribute to the firm through their skills and external resources (Endo 
2020; Miwa and Ramseyer 2005) and have less monitoring role. They are expected to 
act as boundary spanners and to bring important business links and valuable expertise to 
the firm. Firms are likely to use their expertise during debt negotiation(Miwa and Ram-
seyer 2005). Following the above discussions, we test the following hypothesis:
H3 Outside director has a negative relationship with leverage in German and French firms 
and a positive relationship in Japanese firms.
2.3.3  Board size
Board size is another critical CG mechanism that mitigates agency conflict and affects 
its ability to discharge its duties effectively (Platt and Platt 2012; Upadhyay et al. 2014). 
Studies have shown that board size influences its activities (Cheng 2008; Conyon and 
Peck 1998; Hermalin and Weisbach 1988; Jensen 1993). Cheng (2008) argued that a 
larger board is unlikely to take drastic decisions since their decision-making processes 
involve more compromises. Similarly, Coles et  al. (2008) argue that a larger board is 
likely to offer quality advice. On the other hand, Jensen (1993) suggests that a large 
board may lead to a coordination problem that outweighs the benefits of engaging more 
expert on the board. Jensen (1993) argue that a board that includes more than seven 
or eight members is likely to be controlled by the CEO due to its coordination issues. 
Other studies document empirical evidence in support of the effectivenee of smaller 
board (Cheng et  al. 2008; Wang 2012; Yermack 1996). Since the board of German, 
French and Japanese firms are relatively large and include a significant level of repre-
sentation from the employees, we expect a negative relationship between board size and 
leverage. Following the above discussions, we test the following hypothesis:
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H4 Board size has a negative relationship with leverage in German, French and Japanese 
firms.
2.3.4  Board meeting
Meeting frequency is an important monitoring mechanism (Adams and Ferreira 2009; 
Hahn and Lasfer 2016; Ji et al. 2020) and is used to proxy boards’ responsibilities (Linck 
et al. 2008). Agency theory suggests that board meeting may help to align the interest of 
managers with those of shareholders. Although Vafeas (1999) suggest that meeting fre-
quency does not advance the interest of shareholders, Brick and Chidambaran (2010) found 
that frequent meetings are beneficial and enable board members to monitor management 
effectively. Lorca et al. (2011) found that board meetings lower lending cost by influencing 
lenders’ risk assessment.
In Germany and Japan, board members are mandated to meet at least four times a year. 
On the contrary, Viénot (1999) only recommends that the board of French firms should 
meet whenever it is necessary. Unlike in French firms, the frequent meeting of German 
and Japanese boards signals a higher level of monitoring and is likely to influence lenders’ 
assessment positively. Following the above discussions, we test the following hypothesis:
H3 Board meeting has a positive relationship with leverage in German and Japanese firms 
and a negative relationship in French firms.
3  Data and methods
Our study sample is selected from two major European bank-based economies (France 
and Germany) and Japanese firms from 2009 to 2019. Using recent observation helps to 
account for recent changes in the corporate governance of these firms in our sample. The 
German firms used in this study are from SDAX, MDAX and DAX indexes, which consist 
of the German larges firms. We collected data from the SBF 120 and Nikkei 225 index for 
French and Japanese firms, respectively. We excluded utility, financial and mining firms 
since these firms have specific regulation which is likely to affect their capital structure. 
To ensure the robustness of our findings, we excluded observations with missing values. 
We collected our firm-level data from the Datastream and Nikkei Economic and Electronic 
Databank System. Our institutional characteristic variables are constructed using data from 
the world bank index. Our final sample consists of 2266, 759 and 902 firm-year observa-
tion for Japanese, French and German firms, respectively, which implies that we have a 
total firm-year observation of 3927.
3.1  Measurement of dependent and independent variables
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where Dit is the firm’s (i) financial debt at time t. Sit represents a firm’s outstanding ordi-
nary at time t. Pit denotes price per share of each firm (i) at time t.
We measure book leverage as follows,
where TD represents the total debt of a firm and TA means total assets.
Our independent variables are board characteristics such as board gender diversity 
(BGD), board size (BZ), Outside director (ODR) and board meeting(BM). We consid-
ered these board variables since they are the most relevant governance characteristics 
for effective monitoring and are likely to influence firms’ adjustment behaviour. We 
measure BGD as the number of female directors on both executive and supervisory 
board; ODR is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. BSZ is calculated 
as the total number of directors on the board, and BM represents the number of the 
board’s annual meetings.
3.2  Control variable
We isolated the impact of firm and institutional characteristics. Regarding firm character-
istics, we controlled for profitability, asset tangibility, firm size, MBV, liquidity and tax 
since firm-level factors are considered key determinants of capital structure and adjustment 
behaviour (Antoniou et al. 2008; Byoun 2008; Dang et al. 2012; De Miguel and Pindado 
2001; Ozkan 2001; Wanzenried 2006). Dang et al. (2014) suggest that the variation in firm-
level factors results in differentials’ adjustment cost. For instance, prior studies show that 
profitable firms are less likely to use debt, especially when they have internally generated 
funds (Frank and Goyal 2003; Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999). Firms with tangible assets 
are more likely to have a higher debt ratio since the tangibility of asset is shown to mitigate 
firms risk of default and moral hazard problem (Rampini and Viswanathan 2013; Titman 
and Wessels 1988). The asset in place also mitigates adverse selection cost, resulting in 
a higher leverage ratio (Frank and Goyal 2009). Firm size is an inverse proxy of default 
risk (Rajan and Zingales 1995), implying the likelihood of obtaining less costly external 
debt finance. According to the pecking order theory, firms with growth opportunity (MBV) 
increase debt issuance, since their retained earnings are unlikely to cover their financing 
needs. Lipson and Mortal (2009) found that liquid firms have less need for debt finance. 
Öztekin (2015) suggest that optimal leverage depends on the value of a firm’s tax shield.
Following Öztekin and Flannery (2012) and Wanzenried (2006), we isolate the impact 
of institutional factors such as stock market development (STKDEV), Growth in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP_GR) and Inflation (INF). Stock market development is essential 
for firms’ financing decision since it influences the cost of capital, affects the power of 
lenders such as banks and determines how agency problem is managed (Wanzenried 2006). 
Regarding inflation, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) argue that it increases the 
contracting cost of firms and their investors, while (Mills 1996) highlights the negative 
impact of inflation on the discount rate. Isolating the effects of these variables is relevant 
since firms’ ability to obtain external financing depends on their credibility to investors 
(Wanzenried 2006). We discussed the measurement of dependent, independent and control 
variables in Appendix Table 9.








 is the individual firms’ optimal leverage ratio in year t and country j. We 
allowed firms optimal leverage to vary over time and captured the SOA using j, which 
expected to be between zero and 1 (1 > λ > 0). λ can only be 1 when optimal adjustment 
is made. In line with previous studies, we modelled optimal leverage (LEV* ) is a function 
of the board, institutional characteristics and firm characteristics (Dang et al. 2014; Kie-
schnick and Moussawi 2018; Öztekin 2015). Consistent with Öztekin and Flannery (2012), 
we included firm fixed effects to control for the unobserved heterogeneity.
where Fij, and j are coefficient vectors.Xij,t−1 represents board characteristics, firm-level 
factors and institutional characteristics that are expected to influence firms’ optimal lever-
age. Substituting our third equation (Eq. 4) into the partial adjustment model (Eq. 3), we 
achieved the following estimable equation
Unlike previous capital structure studies that applied a static framework (Rajan and Zin-
gales 1995; Titman and Wessels 1988), we employed a dynamic capital structure model 
(GMM) to explain variation in firms’ optimal leverage ratio. The system GMM uses an 
additional instrument, the orthogonal conditions between the disturbances and the lagged 
dependent variables in its estimation (Arellano and Bond 1991). Hansen (1982) argues that 
GMM’s efficiency lies in its exploitation of all linear moment restrictions. We employ a 
two-step GMM which uses the orthogonal conditions on the variance–covariance matrix to 
control error correlation and heteroskedasticity (Blundell and Bond 1998). We employed 
the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions for serial correlation checks. The second-
order autocorrelation is controlled using a test popularised by Arellano and Bond (1991).
4  Results and discussion
4.1  Descriptive statistics
In Table 1, we present the summary statistics of the board, firm-level and institutional vari-
ables used in this study. Our result shows that the average book leverage of French firms 
is 24.6% and is higher than those of German firms (20%) and Japanese firms (18.2%). The 
higher debt ratio of German and French firms suggests the similarity of their CG environ-
ment and a closer relationship between firms and lenders. Surprisingly, Japanese firms’ 
market leverage (27.6%) is on average higher than that of German firms (23.2%) and 
French firms (21%). This higher market leverage suggests’ reduction in firms’ reliance on 
banks as suppliers of capital and is attributable to a series of corporate governance reforms 
since 1980. The percentage of women in German (26%) and French (25%) firms compared 
to Japanese firms (4.7%) show that Japan has one of the lowest board gender quotas among 
all developed countries. Endo (2020) described the Japanese board as ’old-boy networks. 
Similarly, the percentage of the outside director is lower in Japan compared to France and 
Germany. The mean board size and the maximum number of board members are higher in 
both European countries (see Table 2). 







(4)Lev∗ij,t = jXij,t−1 + Fij,




+ Levij,t + jFij, + ij,t
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We used T-Test and Wilcoxon signed-ranked tests to compare the mean of board 
variables. Our result shows a significant variation of the mean values of board variables 
obtained from Japanese German and French firms. Furthermore, using a correlation 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics: board, firm-level, macroeconomics and institutional variables
MkLev, Financial debt divided by financial debt + market value of common stock; BKLev, The ratio of the 
book value of total debt to total assets; BGD, The number of female directors on the board; ODR, Percent-
age of non−executive directors on the board; BZ, Number of directors on the board; BM, Number of meet-
ings held by the board of directors annually; PROF, The ratio of operating profit to total assets’ Book Value; 
ASTANG, The ratio of fixed assets to total assets; FSZ, Natural log of sales; MVB, Book liabilities plus the 
market value of equity divided by book value of assets; LIQ, Total Current Asset divided by Total Current 
Liability; Tx, Current income tax divided income before taxes; STKDEV, Value of listed shares divided by 
GDP; GDP_GR, Annual growth in gross domestic product; INF, Annual Inflation Rate
Standard errors in parentheses; *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Variable Japanf Germany France
Mean Sd Min Max Mean Sd Min Max Mean Sd Min Max
MkLev 27.63 24.03 −9.16 175 0.232 0.166 0.002 0.750 0.211 0.144 0.001 0.746
BKLev 0.182 5.20 −3.03 72.2 0.201 0.179 0 0.750 0.246 0.157 0.001 0.737
BGD 4.73 0.31 0 1 26.31 22.93 0 77 25.73 17.11 0 76
ODR 19.45 12.2 0 100 24.28 32.68 0 100 25.47 18.15 0 63.64
BZ 7.42 4.63 3 16 9.22 4.42 3 21 10.22 4.5 3 23
BM 5.14 3.05 4 12 5.69 1.62 4 9 4.25 3.119 4 12
PROF 0.02 0.0439 −0.61 0.45 0.04 0.069 −0.49 0.65 0.061 0.062 −0.09 0.61
Astang 0.51 0.240 −4.374 4.745 0.25 0.145 0.015 0.744 0.214 0.206 0.001 0.97
FSZ 17.9 1.91 13.30 26.5 14.78 1.59 11.39 19.38 14.98 1.437 12.19 19.03
MVB 1.43 1.83 −48.98 39.67 1.78 1.37 0.07 10.21 2.13 1.825 −5.27 16.12
Liq 2.133 2.069 0.18 58.24 1.39 0.767 0.18 5.87 1.185 1.24 0 4.52
TX 0.949 12.52 −139 551.2 0.18 17.59 −453 254.7 0.18 0.51 −7.407 5.74
STKDEV 1.62 1.26 08.67 4.54 1.32 2.13 1.98 7.83 3.01 2.87 1.63 5.62
GDP_GR 0.79 2.35 −5.62 4.89 1.41 2.49 2.3 4.38 1.26 1.52 −2.79 4.53
INF 0.25 1.01 −1.36 2.86 1.52 0.68 0.29 2.64 1.42 0.83 0.04 2.82
Table 2  Comparison tests of board variables
MkLev; Financial debt divided by financial debt + market value of the common stock, BKLev; The ratio 
of the book value of total debt to total assets, BGD; The number of female directors on the board, ODR; 
Percentage of non-executive directors on the board, BZ; Number of directors on the board, BM; Number of 
meetings held by the board of directors annually. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01
France Japan T-test Wilcoxon Germany Japan T-test Wilcoxon
Mean1 Mean2 t value z value Mean1 Mean2 t value z value
MkLev 0.21 27.63 −33.02*** −39*** 0.23 27.63 −28.72*** −32.13***
BKLev 0.25 0.18 −0.58* 12.32*** 0.20 0.18 −0.83 6.40***
BGD 25.73 4.73 12.1*** 45.36*** 26.31 4.73 84.05*** 52.23***
ODR 25.47 19.45 09.5*** 8.83*** 24.28 19.45 9.8*** −9.15***
BZ 10 7.42 38.2*** 38.21*** 9.22 7.42 56.62*** 26.72***
BM 4.25 5.14 9.01*** 18.01*** 5.69 5.14 −8.18*** −5.51***









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 E. Ezeani et al.
1 3
matrix, we tested for multicollinearity among our independent variables. Multicollinearity 
does not exist in our study since the highest collinearity shown is between tax and liquidity 
(see Table 3, Panel A).
4.2  Regression analysis
We present our study result(using MkLev) for the entire sample in Table 4. Table 5 shows 
the result of additional analysis using BKLev. We also compared the impact of board 
mechanisms on the capital structure of EU firms (Germany and France) and Japanese firms 
in Table  6. We conducted an additional analysis for underleveraged and overleveraged 
firms in Tables 7 and 8.
We estimate market leverage (MkLev) and book leverage (BKLEV) as a function of 
board characteristics, institutional and firm characteristics. Consistent with the trade-off 
theory, we find that the lags of both dependent variables are significant at 1%. This result 
suggests these firms in our sample dynamically adjust their leverage towards their lever-
age target. We find an average SOA of 38% (based on the entire sample). However, after 
excluding board characteristics and re-estimating Eq. 4, we document SOA of 32% (see 
Appendix Table 10).
German firms adjust their leverage at 43% when we include board variables in our 
regression. However, we document slightly lower SOA (40%) after excluding CG varia-
bles. Similarly, we find that French firms adjust at the speed of 39% (including board vari-
ables), which slightly reduced by 5 per cent when we exclude CG variables. Interestingly, 
Japanese firms SOA of 34% is the lowest among the three countries. This SOA decreased 
to 31% after excluding board characteristic, indicating that board characteristics influence 
speedier adjustment among Japanese, French and German firms. One possible explanation 
is the role of corporate governance in mitigating agency conflict. The speediest adjustment 
(with or without CG characteristics) is found among German firms followed by French 
firms before Japanese firms. This result shows that the variation in the CG environment 
even among firms in bank-based economies can result in SOA differentials. This variation 
in the reported SOA is attributable to firms’ ability to obtain debt finance. Prior studies 
show that French and German firm have more access to debt finance since they enjoy a 
closer relationship with their lenders (Antoniou et al. 2008; Dang 2013). Another explana-
tion for the speedy adjustment of German firms is that the strict separation between man-
agement and supervisory board is likely to ensure more effective monitoring resulting in a 
speedy adjustment of German firms.
We also present the results for all countries in Table 4 and 5. We find that market lever-
age declines as the women’s board participation in the German and French firms increases. 
However, we found no relationship for Japanese firms, which is in line with our hypoth-
esis. Consistent with debt conservatism suggested by previous studies (Faccio et al. 2016; 
Hackbarth 2008), our result indicates that the presence of women on the board of Ger-
man and French firms constrains their use of debt. Previous studies show that women have 
less appetite for risky decisions (Adusei and Obeng 2019; Faccio et al. 2016; Palvia et al. 
2015), including debt issuance (Faccio et al. 2016). Regarding Japan, the low participation 
of women in the board system may have led to the insignificant relationship between board 
gender diversity and leverage.
Outside director is negatively related to market leverage in Germany and France but 
shows a positive relationship with market leverage in Japan. The variation of the result 
between European (German and French) firms and Japanese firms may be related to 
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Table 4  Regression result
MkLev, Financial debt divided by financial debt + market value of the 
common stock; BGD, The number of female directors on the board; 
ODR, Percentage of non-executive directors on the board; BZ, Num-
ber of directors on the board; BM, Number of meetings held by the 
board of directors annually; PROF, The ratio of operating profit to 
total assets’ Book Value; ASTANG, The ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets; FSZ, Natural log of sales; MVB, Book liabilities plus the mar-
ket value of equity divided by book value of assets; LIQ, Total Cur-
rent Asset divided by Total Current Liability; Tx, Current income tax 
divided income before taxes; STKDEV, Value of listed shares divided 
by GDP; GDP_GR, Annual growth in gross domestic product; INF, 
Annual Inflation Rate
Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Variables Full sample Japan Germany France
(1) (2) (5) (7)
MkLev MkLev MkLev MkLev
L.MkLev 0.6188*** 0.6528*** 0.5642*** 0.6172***
(0.0123) (0.0228) (0.0401) (0.0132)
BGD −0.0122*** −2.3476 −0.0002*** −0.0011***
(0.0140) (0.4031) (0.0006) (0.0004)
ODR −0.0028 0.0054** −0.0004** −0.0030**
(0.0073) (0.0142) (0.0002) (0.0001)
BZ −0.0041 −0.0181* −0.0004** −0.0012***
(0.0127) (0.0402) (0.0015) (0.0011)
BM 0.0328 0.0423* −0.0207*** −0.0021
(0.0240) (0.0203) (0.0041) (0.0010)
PROF −0.0202** 0.0571 −0.0314 −0.0641
(0.0171) (0.143) (0.0573) (0.0326)
Astang 0.0628*** 0.0732*** 0.0427 0.0422***
(0.0615) (0.0235) (0.0177) (0.0342)
FSZ 2.0284*** 5.3829*** −0.0204*** −0.0080**
(0.3229) (0.3251) (0.0061) (0.0034)
MBV 0.2432*** 0.2604*** 0.0027 0.0039
(0.0538) (0.0593) (0.0053) (0.0023)
Liq −0.0292*** −0.0174** 0.0269 −0.0035
(0.0723) (0.0927) (0.0162) (0.0024)
TX −0.0004 0.0028 −0.0008 −0.0042
(0.0057) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0032)
STKDEV 0.0420 0.00064 0.00142 0.00131
(0.0512) (0.002) (0.018) (0.0025)
GDP_GR 0.0477** 0.0274 −0.0007 0.0029**
(0.0327) (0.0112) (0.0014) (0.0013)
INF −0.3228*** −0.4226*** −0.0036 0.0062
(0.0604) (0.0672) (0.0058) (0.0023)
SOA (%) SOA 38 34% 43% 39%
AR 1 0.001 0.017 0.029 0.037
AR 2 0.372 0.283 0.389 0.187
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different roles of outside directors within this system. Miwa and Ramseyer (2005) argue 
that Japanese outside directors span boundary and offer their helpful expertise end valuable 
connection to firms they serve. In Germany and France, outside directors’ control function 
(Kim et al. 2007) may have led to the inverse relationship with market leverage.
Table 5  Additional analysis 
(BKLEV)
BKLev; The ratio of the book value of total debt to total assets, BGD; 
The number of female directors on the board, ODR; Percentage of 
non-executive directors on the board, BZ; Number of directors on the 
board, BM; Number of meetings held by the board of directors annu-
ally, PROF; The ratio of operating profit to total assets’ Book Value, 
ASTANG; The ratio of fixed assets to total assets, FSZ; Natural log of 
sales, MVB; Book liabilities plus the market value of equity divided 
by book value of assets, LIQ; Total Current Asset divided by Total 
Current Liability, Tx; Current income tax divided income before 
taxes, STKDEV; Value of listed shares divided by GDP, GDP_GR; 
Annual growth in gross domestic product, INF; Annual Inflation Rate
Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Variables Full sample Japan Germany France
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BKLev BKLev BKLev BKLev
L.BKLev
BGD −0.0327*** −0.0502 −0.0014*** −0.0020***
(0.0062) (0.0821) (0.0024) (0.0013)
ODR 0.0007** 0.0141** −0.0024*** −0.0002**
(0.0032) (0.0076) (0.0028) (0.0001)
BZ −0.0071* −0.0162*** −0.0022*** −0.0080
(0.0052) (0.0246) (0.0005) (0.0006)
BM 0.0421 0.0224 −0.0060*** −0.0014
(0.0601) (0.0742) (0.0051) (0.0203)
PROF −0.0307*** 0.0714*** −0.0161*** −0.0651**
(0.2623) (0.4271) (0.0427) (0.0497)
Astang 0.0774*** 0.0988*** 0.0466 0.0671
(0.3262) (0.5437) (0.1245) (0.0637)
FSZ 0.1023*** 0.0530*** −0.0419*** −0.0389**
(0.1281) (0.0308) (0.0061) (0.0049)
MBV 0.0562** 0.0204*** 0.0028 0.0046*
(0.0206) (0.0245) (0.0042) (0.0017)
Liq −0.0116*** −0.0157*** −0.0125 −0.0024
(0.0348) (0.0402) (0.0379) (0.0034)
TX 0.0034 0.0076** −0.0083 −0.0029
(0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0003) (0.0055)
STKDEV −0.00211 −0.00248 −0.0047 0.00053
(0.014) (0.005) (0.0016) (0.0003)
GDP_GR −0.0327 −0.0425 0.0016 −0.0003
(0.0354) (0.0145) (0.0030) (0.0034)
INF −0.0302 −0.0643* −0.0125** 0.0006
(0.0446) (0.0308) (0.0049) (0.0021)
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Table 6  Additional analysis 
(Japan and EU)
MkLev, Financial debt divided by financial debt + market value of the 
common stock; BGD, The number of female directors on the board; 
ODR, Percentage of non-executive directors on the board; BZ, Num-
ber of directors on the board; BM, Number of meetings held by the 
board of directors annually; PROF, The ratio of operating profit to 
total assets’ Book Value; ASTANG, The ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets; FSZ, Natural log of sales; MVB, Book liabilities plus the mar-
ket value of equity divided by book value of assets; LIQ, Total Cur-
rent Asset divided by Total Current Liability; Tx, Current income tax 
divided income before taxes; STKDEV, Value of listed shares divided 
by GDP; GDP_GR, Annual growth in gross domestic product; INF, 
Annual Inflation Rate
Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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Table 7  Additional analysis—
underleveraged firms
MkLev; Financial debt divided by financial debt + market value of the 
common stock, BGD; The number of female directors on the board, 
ODR; Percentage of non-executive directors on the board, BZ; Num-
ber of directors on the board, BM; Number of meetings held by the 
board of directors annually, PROF; The ratio of operating profit to 
total assets’ Book Value, ASTANG; The ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets, FSZ; Natural log of sales, MVB; Book liabilities plus the mar-
ket value of equity divided by book value of assets, LIQ; Total Cur-
rent Asset divided by Total Current Liability, Tx; Current income tax 
divided income before taxes, STKDEV; Value of listed shares divided 
by GDP, GDP_GR; Annual growth in gross domestic product, INF; 
Annual Inflation Rate
Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Variables Full sample Japan German France
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MkLev MkLev MkLev MkLev
L.MkLev 0.6013*** 0.7117*** 0.6128*** 0.6331***
(0.0354) (0.0165) (0.0338) (0.0531)
BGD −0.0035 −0.0526 −0.0004* −0.007**
(0.0052) (0.0942) (0.0032) (0.0004)
ODR −0.0006 −0.0046 0.0004 −0.0003
(0.0027) (0.0229) (0.0008) (0.0014)
BZ −0.0051 −0.0120 −0.0002 −0.0007
(0.0062) (0.0472) (0.0032) (0.0006)
BM −0.0226 0.0043 0.0013 0.0006
(0.0175) (0.0453) (0.0024) (0.0009)
PROF −0.023*** −0.0432*** −0.0124 −0.053***
(0.0214) (0.0473) (0.0216) (0.0325)
Astang −0.0263*** −0.0466*** −0.0051 −0.0731
(0.2405) (0.3403) (0.0425) (0.0424)
FSZ 0.0206*** 0.0365*** 0.0023 0.0072**
(0.0783) (0.5103) (0.0042) (0.0032)
MVB 0.0073 0.0572 0.0085 −0.0039
(0.0346) (0.0865) (0.0043) (0.0038)
Liq −0.0628* −0.0471 −0.0023 −0.0040
(0.0475) (0.0586) (0.0324) (0.0062)
TX −0.0046 −0.0082 −0.0062 −0.0005
(0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0008) (0.0041)
STKDEV 0.0011 −0.0027 −0.0037 −0.0011
(0.0010) (0.0021) (0.0042) (0.0040)
GDP_GR 0.0186 −0.0042 0.0002 0.0059***
(0.0126) (0.0282) (0.0031) (0.0120)
INF 0.0533 −0.0684*** −0.0055 0.0027
(0.0116) (0.0536) (0.00432) (0.0016)
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Table 8  Additional analysis 
-overleveraged firms
MkLev, Financial debt divided by financial debt + market value of the 
common stock; BGD, The number of female directors on the board; 
ODR, Percentage of non-executive directors on the board; BZ, Num-
ber of directors on the board; BM, Number of meetings held by the 
board of directors annually; PROF, The ratio of operating profit to 
total assets’ Book Value; ASTANG, The ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets; FSZ, Natural log of sales; MVB, Book liabilities plus the mar-
ket value of equity divided by book value of assets; LIQ, Total Cur-
rent Asset divided by Total Current Liability; Tx, Current income tax 
divided income before taxes; STKDEV, Value of listed shares divided 
by GDP; GDP_GR, Annual growth in gross domestic product; INF, 
Annual Inflation Rate
Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Variables Full sample Japan German France
(1) (3) (5) (7)
MkLev MkLev MkLev MkLev
L.MkLev 0.6251*** 0.7266*** 0.5662*** 0.6592***
(0.0631) (0.0527) (0.0752) (0.0461)
BGD 0.0802 −0.7715 −0.0048* −0.0052*
(0.0306) (0.0126) (0.0044) (0.0014)
ODR −0.0062 0.0361* 0.0023 0.0116
(0.0348) (0.0124) (0.0014) (0.0034)
BZ −0.0704** −0.0219*** 0.0006 −0.0029
(0.0266) (0.0836) (0.0004) (0.0021)
BM −0.0416 0.0104 −0.0023 −0.0061***
(0.0422) (0.0443) (0.0211) (0.0065)
PROF −0.7612 0.0743*** −0.0546*** −0.0375***
(0.1716) (0.2543) (0.0845) (0.0732)
Astang −0.0794*** −0.0813*** −0.0329*** −0.0731
(0.3934) (0.4383) (0.0754) (0.0431)
FSZ 0.0804*** 0.0482*** −0.0343*** −0.0204**
(0.0684) (0.0431) (0.0073) (0.0065)
MVB 0.04216*** 0.0577 0.0031 0.0207***
(0.0932) (0.0453) (0.0031) (0.0059)
Liq −0.0321*** −0.0912*** 0.0648*** −0.0213*
(0.2252) (0.4276) (0.0246) (0.0261)
TX −0.0027 −0.0057 −0.0036** −0.0052
(0.0126) (0.0287) (0.0061) (0.0054)
STKDEV 0.0010 −0.0048 −0.0031 −0.0010
(0.0020) (0.0059) (0.0031) (0.0029)
GDP_GR 0.0672* 0.0520 −0.0028** 0.0027
(0.0526) (0.0680) (0.0027) (0.0015)
INF −0.6456*** −0.8915*** 0.0025 0.0043
(0.0838) (0.2025) (0.0067) (0.0072)
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Board size is negatively related to the market leverage in Japan, German and France, 
meaning that the size of the board reduces the use of leverage in a bank-based (stakeholder-
oriented) economy. We also document a higher statistical relationship for German and 
French firms and a weaker relationship for Japanese firms. This relationship is expected 
for German, French and Japanese firms due to the relatively large board among in stake-
holder-oriented CG environment, including a significant level of representation from the 
employees.
Board meeting is inversely related to market leverage in Germany, implying that fre-
quent meeting of board members constrains debt usage in these countries. This result con-
tradicts our expectation of a positive relationship. As expected, we found a positive rela-
tionship between board meeting and leverage among Japanese firms. Lorca et  al. (2011) 
show that board meeting frequency results in a lower lending cost, thereby influencing 
lenders’ risk assessment. Other studies have suggested that the frequency of board meet-
ings signals its monitoring ability (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Hahn and Lasfer 2016), 
which is likely to influence lenders assessment of the company. Furthermore, we found 
no relationship between board meetings and market leverage among French firms, which 
may be due to the voluntary nature of boards meeting in France in line with Viénot (1999) 
recommendation.
4.3  Additional analysis
We conducted an additional analysis using book leverage. We found that board gender 
diversity is inversely related to book leverage in Germany and France but show no relation-
ship for Japanese firms. Similar to our main result, outside directors have a positive rela-
tionship with book leverage among Japanese firms but shows a negative relationship for 
German and French firms. Board size is also negatively related to book leverage in Japan 
and Germany. We document a similar result after separating our sample into EU countries 
(France and Germany) and Japan.
Board gender diversity is inversely related to MkLev for overleveraged and underlever-
aged European firms. Also, outside directors are positively related to market leverage for 
Japanese (overleveraged) firms, while board size shows a negative relationship with market 
leverage.
5  Conclusion
In this study, we examine and compares the impact of board characteristics on the capital 
structure and speed of adjustment of Japanese, German and French firms. This study is 
important because these three countries have distinct corporate governance environment 
but also remarkable differences in their corporate governance environment.
We show that board characteristics influence speedier adjustment for Japanese, French 
and German firms. This result may be due to the role of corporate governance in mitigat-
ing agency conflict. The speediest adjustment (with or without CG characteristics) is found 
among German firms followed by French firms before Japanese firms, confirming the vari-
ation in the CG environment even among firms in bank-based economies.
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We found an inverse relationship between board gender diversity and leverage for Ger-
man and French firms on the relationship between board characteristics and leverage. We 
found no relationship with Japanese firms. Outside director is negatively related to market 
leverage in Germany and France but shows a positive relationship with market leverage in 
Japan. Board size is negatively related to the market leverage in all three countries, while 
board meeting is negatively related to leverage in Germany. We found a similar result after 
employing book leverage.
Our finding makes a significant contribution since it shows the varying impact of board 
characteristics on firms’ capital structure in these bank-based economies. Additionally, 
the inverse relationship between board gender diversity and market leverage in France and 
Germany is relevant for the composition of corporate boards. It shows the needs for wom-
en’s involvement on the corporate board.
Although our study focuses on the three most developed bank-based economies, future 
studies may benefit from a larger sample involving other bank-based countries. It would 
also be interesting to examine the impact of board characteristics on firms’ capital structure 
in developing countries.
Appendix
See Tables 9 and 10.
Table 9  Measurement of variables
Variables Definition Measurement
MKLEV Market Leverage Financial debt divided by financial debt + market value of com-
mon stock
BKLEV Book Leverage The ratio of the book value of total debt to total assets
BGD Board Gender Diversity The number of female directors on the board
ODR Board Independence Percentage of non-executive directors on the board
BZ Board Size Number of directors on the board
BM Board Meeting Number of meetings held by the board of directors annually
PROF Profitability The ratio of operating profit to total assets’ Book Value
ASTANG Asset Tangibility The ratio of fixed assets to total assets
FSZ Firm Size Natural log of sales
MVB Growth Opportunity Book liabilities plus the market value of equity divided by book 
value of assets
LIQ Liquidity Total Current Asset divided by Total Current Liability
TX Tax Current Income Tax divided by income before taxes
STKDEV Stock Market Development The value of listed shares divided by GDP
GDP_GR Gross Domestic Product Annual growth in gross domestic product
INF Inflation Annual Inflation Rate
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Table 10  Regression result 
(without board variables)
MkLev, Financial debt divided by financial debt + market value of the 
common stock; BGD, The number of female directors on the board; 
ODR, Percentage of non-executive directors on the board; BZ, Num-
ber of directors on the board; BM, Number of meetings held by the 
board of directors annually; PROF, The ratio of operating profit to 
total assets’ Book Value; ASTANG, The ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets; FSZ, Natural log of sales; MVB, Book liabilities plus the mar-
ket value of equity divided by book value of assets; LIQ, Total Cur-
rent Asset divided by Total Current Liability; Tx, Current income tax 
divided income before taxes; STKDEV, Value of listed shares divided 
by GDP; GDP_GR, Annual growth in gross domestic product; INF, 
Annual Inflation Rate
Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Variables Full sample Japan Germany France
(1) (2) (5) (7)
MkLev MkLev MkLev MkLev
L.MkLev 0.680*** 0.692*** 0.597*** 0.664***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.062) (0.069)
PROF −0.036*** −0.045*** −0.054* −0.0408
(0.075) (0.043) (0.061) (0.039)
Astang −0.051*** −0.067*** 0.082 0.064***
(0.043) (0.028) (0.073) (0.055)
FSZ 0.074*** 0.0602*** −0.048*** −0.03***
(0.052) (0.031) (0.038) (0.025)
MBV 0.047*** 0.028*** 0.032 0.042
(0.074) (0.051) (0.036) (0.013)
Liq −0.051*** −0.714 0.064 0.012
(0.07) (0.058) (0.029) (0.026)
TX −0.023 −0.0047 −0.0032** −0.0074
(0.023) (0.0183) (0.0012) (0.0026)
STKDEV 0.0833 0.0072 0.0028 0.0002
(0.067) (0.003) (0.004) (0.021)
GDP_GR 0.028* 0.023 −0.083 0.094
(0.013) (0.022) (0.043) (0.052)
INF −0.227*** −0.581*** 0.073 −0.082
(0.059) (0.086) (0.035) (0.092)
SOA (%) SOA 32 31% 40% 34%
AR 1 0.001 0.033 0.002 0.014
AR 2 0.351 0.142 0.239 0.411
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